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1 Introduction
Investment in human capital is risky. Both the amount of human capital produced from
given effort and resources and the returns to human capital are uncertain at the time of
investment. As individuals are known to differ in risk attitudes,1 one predicts, given
everything else, a relationship between risk attitudes, investment and wages: less risk
averse individuals will invest more and will experience higher wage growth and more
wage volatility. This indeed is exactly what Shaw (1996) attempted to test. She reports
clear support for the prediction that risk averse individuals shy away from investing in
(risky) human capital and hence, experience less wage growth. In spite of the obvious
relevance of the topic, other empirical research on the relationship barely exists.2
We replicate Shaw’s estimates on datasets for four countries: an extension of her
original American data set and data for Spain, Germany, and Italy. Hamermesh (2007),
following the psychologist John Hunter, distinguishes between statistical and scien-
tific replication. Statistical replication involves estimating an identical model on a
different sample from the same underlying population. Scientific replication involves
estimating a perhaps similar, but not identical model on a different sample from a dif-
ferent population. In Hamermesh’ view, the latter “appears much more suited in type
to our methods of research and, indeed comprises most of what economists view as
replication”. We believe that replication of the same model is relevant if one assumes
that models and theories have wider relevance than just one population conditioned by
time or place. In our view, the first step in building a solid body of empirical evidence
would be to use the same model, and only adjust if evidence compels us to do so. In
our perception, the philosophy underlying empirical work is twofold: test our theories
and models and estimate the magnitude of key parameters. If we would not start out
from a standard model but adjust the model even before empirical investigation, the
whole enterprise would be erratic and ill directed.
We decided to replicate Shaw’s work for several reasons. First, the topic is rele-
vant and deserves more research. Second, it’s a seminal paper: the first systematic
investigation of the link between risk attitude and wages.3 Third, the model derives
its empirical specification from economic theory, which we consider sound methodo-
logical practice. Fourth, the model is intuitively appealing. Fifth, as Shaw’s empirical
results were clearly in support of the key hypothesis, it is worth checking whether
this points to an empirical regularity with wider validity. Bonin et al. (2007) report
that individuals sort themselves into occupations differing in wage risk on the basis
of their risk attitude and find that less risk averse individuals have higher wage levels;
they do not use the Shaw framework. Brown and Taylor (2005) find that in the United
Kingdom, wage growth relates negatively to risk aversion; their model is inspired
1 For empirical documentation, see Hartog et al. (2002), Dohmen et al. (2011), Ding et al. (2010).
2 Belzil and Leopardi (2007) studied the impact of risk attitudes on formal education in Italy. Hartog
and Diaz-Serrano (2007) find that risk aversion affects investment in education. Diaz-Serrano (2005) esti-
mates a negative link between risk aversion and income volatility in Italy. Hryshko et al. (2008) report the
same result for the US, attributing this to selection into riskier occupations rather than to human capital
investment.
3 The paper is a standard reference in related work: in June 2010, it had 93 citations at Google.
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by Shaw (1996) but it is not a strict replication. As stated above, we prefer a tighter
methodology: theory should guide us to a specification for empirical work, empirical
analysis should test this specification and its validity under a variety of conditions of
time and place.
We find that risk attitude and wages are connected, but not exactly in the way that
the Shaw model predicts. Adjustment is called for and we present some suggestions in
the concluding section. In the next section, we present the model that Shaw developed.
In Sect. 3 we introduce and discuss our data sets, in Sect. 4 we present the replication
results, and in Sect. 5 we test the constraints imposed on the model. Section 6 considers
sensitivity to the time frames of measurement and Sect. 7 concludes. Detailed data
descriptions and additional results are given in Online Appendices A and B.
2 The Shaw model
For a given individual, suppressing possible subscripts for potential variation across
individuals, Shaw starts from the standard human capital earnings function:
Wt = (1 − st )kt (1)
The observed wage equals the value of the human capital stock, net of new investment
cost, at human capital rental rate equal to unity. Assuming differences between st and
st−1 are small enough to neglect and defining γt as productivity of the investment, it
is straightforward to derive the approximation
 ln Wt = γt st−1 (2)
Using a model for optimal lifetime investment in human and financial capital, follow-
ing Williams (1979), the investment share s can be written as
s = μh − η
σ 2h R
(3)
where R is the Arrow–Pratt measure of relative risk aversion and μh−η
σ 2h
is the Sharpe
ratio for human capital: the expected net return to human capital investment relative to
its variance (the return to risk). η is the marginal rate of substitution between financial
wealth and human capital, assumed constant, and μh is the expected rate of return on
human capital.
Shaw applies two alternative strategies to measure risk attitude R: either use direct
survey measures or infer R from the financial investment portfolio. The latter is deter-
mined by a similar equation for the share of financial investments allocated to risky
assets:
α = μf − r
σ 2f R
= 1
bR
(4)
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where μf is the expected return to risky financial assets, σ 2f its variance, and r the
return on safe assets. The financial Sharpe ratio 1/b is a constant determined in the
capital market. We can then substitute for s in (2):
 ln Wt = bα
(
γ (μh − η)
σ 2h
)
(5)
The benefits from human capital investment are specified as
γi (μhi − η) = Xi A + ξi (6)
with ξi i.i.d. measurement errors and X a matrix of individual characteristics. This
implies that the wage growth equation equals
 ln Wi = bαi
σ 2hi
(Xi A) + ei (7)
Thus, individual wage growth is related to the observable investment share of risky
assets α multiplied by the benefits from human capital investments. As Shaw notes,
the error term is heteroscedastic, as it depends on the financial investment share αi :
ei = bαiξi/σ 2h : residual variance is increasing in risky wealth share.
With direct observations on risk aversion R, we can substitute (5) in (4), to get
 ln Wt = γ μk − η
σ 2
1
R
(8)
and again using (6) we have
 ln Wt = 1
σ 2h R
(Xi A) + ei (9)
with heteroscedastic errors as before as ei = ξi/σ 2h Ri depends on individual risk
attitude R: residual variance is decreasing with increasing risk aversion. Now, wage
growth is explained from productivity growth divided by risk aversion.
In her empirical application, Shaw estimates, for individual i ,
 ln Wi = (1 + β0Riskattitudei )Xi A + γ ′Hi + ei (10)
where  ln Wi is hourly wage growth, Riskattitude measures the attitude of an individ-
ual toward risk, Xi is the matrix for human capital variables and Hi includes additional
controls. The essence of the model is a multiplicative specification of human capital
stock and risk attitude.
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3 Datasets
We use data from four different sources: an extension of Shaw’s original American
data (the Survey of Consumer Finances, SCF), the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP), the Spanish Survey of Household Finances (EFF), and the Italian Survey
of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). These surveys are run at the household
level and although we have some information for all adults, in the SCF, the EFF and
the SHIW, the amount of risky assets is only available at the household level and the
self-reported risk attitude questions are only asked to the “reference” person in the
household.4 Therefore, the empirical analysis includes only the reference person in
each household except for the German SOEP in which we include all individuals older
than 16. These datasets are described in Online Appendix A.
Shaw performed her test with the SCF from 1983 to 1986. This means that the
individual wage growth was calculated over a three year period. This decision was
most probably driven by data availability. The time interval of the SCF sample is now
1983–1989; Shaw’s original dataset referring to 1983–1986 is no longer available.5
The individual risk attitude is measured in 1989, i.e., the last year of the time period.
In order to be consistent with all data sets we will for all other countries also measure
wage growth using the periods before the risk measure. For the German sample, we
use the period 2000 to 2004, as our risk measure is only available for 2004. Taking a
four year interval allows us to stay close to both Shaw’s original results (1983–1986)
and the current US sample (1983–1989). In the SHIW (Italy) only the 1995 wave
contains questions related to risk attitudes. We use the waves corresponding to 1993
and 1995 to estimate real wage growth. We chose this particular two year interval
since it provides an acceptable number of individuals with valid answers in the risk
attitude question that are present in both waves (1,357 household heads).6 Finally, we
use the first wave (2002) of the EFF (Spain). In contrast with the other data sets, the
EFF is not a panel and, consequently, data on individuals’ wages over time is missing.
Still, we can compute wage growth within the firm, as the EFF includes a question in
which individuals are asked their starting salary in the present company. Since there
is information on tenure, we can compute the total wage growth of individuals since
they entered the firm. This means that we are only looking at the subgroup of workers
that Shaw calls “job stayers” (see Table 3 of Shaw’s paper). Except for some effects
on magnitudes, this is immaterial, as her results also hold separately for job stayers.
This strategy allows us to calculate the wage growth before the year in which risk
attitude is measured. A difference with Shaw’s sub-sample of stayers however is that
4 The reference person is normally defined as the person, or one of the persons, responsible for the accom-
modation and the household financial issues.
5 Kathryn Shaw also informed us that she no longer has her original data files.
6 If we also consider the missing values in the risk attitude question the total sample is of 1,654 household
heads. Some of the cases with missing response on risk attitude do have response on assets.
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while she focuses only on job stayers in a 3-year period, we consider all the surveyed
workers and their corresponding tenure in the present firm.7
As Shaw, we define wage growth over the period as hourly wage growth except for
Spain, where information on the number of hours worked in a normal week when the
individual entered the firm is not available and we can therefore not compute the past
hourly wage, although we know the yearly wage at that time. Therefore, the results
from the EFF are based on yearly wages.8
As in Shaw’s paper, for all data sets except for the German SOEP, we present
the results of two alternative measures of an individual’s attitudes towards risk. One
is based on the financial assets owned by the household (ASSET) and another on
self-reported risk attitudes. The variable ASSET is a measure of risk behavior based on
the percentage of risky assets (bonds, shares, and mutual funds) over all the household’s
assets. In the empirical regression, self-reported risk attitude (the second risk measure)
is introduced in all regressions except for Germany through two dummy variables,
i.e., RISK3 (which equals 1 if individuals are willing to take average risks) and RISK4
(which equals 1 if individuals are not willing to take any risks). The reference group
consists of people who reported to be willing to take “substantial” or “above-aver-
age” risks. So, RISK3 and RISK4 indicate increasing levels of risk aversion. In the
Italian data these two variables are calculated using the household heads response on
a reservation price of an investment opportunity question. This allows us to construct
a measure of absolute risk aversion (see Online Appendix); although the theoretical
prediction is formulated with relative risk aversion, we use absolute risk aversion, as
the risk dummies are not identified as relative measures either and multiplying with
wealth would add much measurement error.9
In the German SOEP data we do not have the necessary information on individ-
ual possession of financial assets. There is however information on self-reported risk
attitudes. The information on self-reported risk attitudes in the German data set dif-
fers slightly from that in the SCF. In the SOEP, respondents are asked to report their
willingness to take risks in a variety of areas, such as financial matters, health, occu-
pation, and leisure and sport. We base our results on the willingness to take risks
in the occupation, obviously the relevant domain. The answer to the willingness to
take risk is recorded on a 0–10 scale, where 0 stands for complete unwilling to take
risks and 10 for completely willing (see Dohmen et al. 2011, for validity issues). In
other words, risk attitudes are measured through a categorical variable that can take
7 We considered restricting our sample to 3-year-stayers only, but that leaves us with only 202 observa-
tions (down from 758). Non-linear regressions did not converge and almost all variables in Table 2 had
insignificant coefficients.
8 Hourly earnings is the common unit in analysis of wage differentials. This is less than satisfactory, as most
labour markets do not operate on an hourly basis and many jobs have implicit contracts with undetermined
hours and unspecified relationship between hours and pay. In our Italian dataset we get good results with
annual earnings in all specifications; this is not the case with hourly earnings.
9 The model predicts inverse proportionality between wage growth and risk attitude. We follow Shaw in
estimating with direct proportionality. In the Italian dataset, using the inverse of risky asset share also gives
significant results.
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11 values. Since in the model risk attitudes are interacted with the human capi-
tal variables, introducing risk attitudes through a dummy variable approach makes
the results very difficult to interpret. Therefore, we opt for transforming risk atti-
tudes into a variable that can take values on the whole real axis by following Terza
(1987) and include the transformed variables in the regression as any other continuous
variable.
The set of controls included in vector Hi is identical to those used in Shaw for the
US Survey (SCF) and is adapted to the particular characteristics of each of the other
three countries, namely, Germany, Italy, and Spain. In the US the vector Hi includes
thus three dummy variables indicating whether the individual is a male, black, or mem-
ber of a worker union. In the German case, control variables consist of three dummy
variables that take value 1 if the respondent lives in East Germany, is of German origin
(as opposed to immigrant), and is a male. The first two dummy variables are added to
represent the ethnic component in the German sample. The gender variable included
in the regression is defined as in the US case. In Italy, the controls included in vector
Hi are dummies for region (North, Center, and South), gender, marital status, and part
time work. In Spain, there are four dummy variables indicating whether the individual
works for a big firm (more than 500 workers), is a male, has a non-permanent contract
and is single. The dummy variables big firm, no permanent contract, and single are
included to represent the importance of the insider–outsider effects in Spain (outsiders
are young rather than old, have a temporary rather than a permanent contract and work
in small firms rather than in big firms).
In the table below, we summarize features of the datasets. We can draw on datasets
that are fairly similar to the original data, but with some unavoidable differences as
well. The US extension set is most similar, except for a smaller number of observa-
tions. The Spanish dataset is from a survey that copies the American original and is
also very close, except for a smaller number of observations and a deviant interval of
wage growth measurement.
The measurement of risk attitudes by self-assessment is not identical in all datasets.
Shaw uses a four-point scale for risk taking in financial matters, and the same variable
is used in our replications for the US and Spain. In Italy, our measure is based on the
reservation price for a risky financial asset. For Germany, we use an 11-point scale for
risk taking in the occupational domain. This variety is an inevitable shortcoming of our
tests. We know that the different measures correlate, but far from perfectly (Ding et al.
2010). Imperfect correlation leads to noise in the comparison with results for Italy and
Germany, but not for Spain and the US. It is hard to predict how large the effect may
be. Empirical research indicates that risk attitudes are domain specific (Slovic 1972;
Warneryd 1996; Weber et al. 2002; Dohmen et al. 2005; Ding et al. 2010). Dohmen
et al. (2005) claim that risk attitude in general is a superior measure, but using it for
the German data does not improve our results (see Sect. 6).
Shaw’s original work uses risk attitudes measured before observing wage growth,
while in our European data risk attitude is measured after observing wage growth.
In Sect. 6, we argue that the dangers of endogeneity are not as serious as one might
fear.
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Table 1 Samples and definitions
US original US replication Spain Italy Germany
Sample SCF86 SCF89 EFF SHIW SOEP
Years 1983–1986 1983–1989 2002 1993–1995 2000–2004
No. of obs. 2199 1497 758 1357 7631
Risk attitude Financial risk
attitude
Idem Idem ARA from
reservation
price financial
invest.
Risk attitude in
occupation, 11
levels
Assets Share of finan-
cial wealth in
risky assets
Idem Idem Idem NA
Fraction with
asset = 0
0.49 0.43 0.56 0.88 –
Wage growth 1983–1986 1983–1989 At present employer 1993–1995 2000–2004
4 Replicating Shaw’s results
4.1 Basic replication
We start by replicating Shaw’s baseline results as reported in her Table 1. To be pre-
cise,10 we estimated (11A) with the asset share specification A for risk and (11D) with
the dummy specification D for risk:
 ln Wi = a0 +
J∑
j=1
a j xi j + β Asseti a0 + β Asseti
J∑
j=1
a j xi j +
K∑
k=1
ahk Hki+ei
(11A)
 ln Wi = a0 +
J∑
j=1
a j xi j + [β3Risk3i + β4Risk4i ] a0
+ [β3Risk3i + β4Risk4i ]
J∑
j=1
a j xi j +
K∑
k=1
ahk Hki+ei (11D)
The variable Asset is the share of financial wealth invested in risky assets, Risk3 (“take
average risk”) and Risk4 (“take no risk”) are the risk attitude dummies, with taking
10 We deduced the specification from Shaw’s equation (8), plus information in the text, the footnote to
Table 1 and note 11.
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Table 2 Shaw’s original results, SCF 1983–1986 ln(hourly wage)
ASSET Risk dummies
Coef. t Coef. t
Asset β 1.04 2.39
Risk aversion weak (RISK3) β3 −0.4650 −4.37
Risk aversion strong (RISK4) β4 −0.5080 −4.54
Change years tenure (DTENURE) ax1 0.0320 6.08 0.0450 5.08
Change years tenure2 (DTEN2) ax2 −0.0006 −3.07 −0.0007 −2.23
Change years experience2 (DEXP2) ax3 −0.0007 −3.49 −0.0007 −4.79
Years of education (EDUC) ax4 0.0071 2.42 0.0068 1.79
R2 0.0559 0.0586
Sum squared error/sum weights 22.25 22.05
Source Shaw (1996, Table 1)
substantial and above-average risk as the omitted category.11 For ease of comparison,
we reprint Shaw’s Table 1, as our Table 2.
Shaw does not report the coefficients on the controls in H nor the intercept. The
variables included in X are: changes in tenure, changes in tenure squared, changes in
experience squared and level of education.12 The results Shaw reports are completely
in line with her predictions: risk-taking individuals obtain, through tenure, experi-
ence and education, higher increases on wages. These clear results provided the prime
stimulus to the present replication study.
Estimation results of the Shaw model using an extension of her data set (1983–1989
instead of 1983–1986) and the German, Spanish, and Italian data set13 are given in
Table 3. Following her specification, we use sampling weights to restore representa-
tivity in case of oversampling particular groups (which is not necessary for the Italian
sample). Although Shaw only presents results for the main variables, we show the
complete table.
As mentioned above, a particularity of the Spanish sample is that we only have infor-
mation on individual’s current wage and their starting wage with the present employer.
This means that the Spanish data resemble Shaw’s sub-sample of job stayers. Empir-
ically, this implies that the changes in tenure are equal to changes in experience and
the (linear) effects of experience on wage growth cannot be disentangled from the
(linear) effects of tenure. Thus we refer to the relevant variable as change in years of
tenure/years of experience.
11 The original survey has four answers: “take substantial risks”, “take above-average risks”, “take average
risks”, and “take no risks”.
12 See Footnote 11 and the note to Table 1 in Shaw’s paper. The constant term is required to identify β:
without it the distinction between β and A would be arbitrary.
13 Following Shaw, we use the 20–64 age interval. For the SCF and the EFF, the results do not change
significantly when this interval is changed (23–61 and 25–59 give similar coefficients).
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Table 3 shows that Shaw’s initial results cannot unequivocally be reproduced. Con-
sider first the results on the core theme, the mediating effect of risk attitude on invest-
ment intensity. When we measure risk attitude through asset holdings, the theory is
confirmed for the US and for Spain, but not for Italy. For the US, the magnitude of the
effect is similar to the original estimate (1.116 against 1.04). With direct measures of
risk attitude, the model is clearly rejected for Germany and support in Spain is weak.
In the US, more risk averse workers still have lower wage growth, but the most risk
averse (Risk4) have no longer a wage growth that differs from those who love to take
risk. For Italy, with the measure of absolute risk aversion, the prediction is strongly
supported. Thus, the replication results are mixed, even for the US. In the European
countries, either the dummy measure has the predicted effects or the asset measure
has, but not both. In Germany we have only one measure and it does not have the
predicted effect.
The role of the human capital variables in explaining wage growth is also different
from the initial results. In Table 2, the effect of changes in tenure is mostly positive and
concave and presumably, the same holds for changes in experience (where only the
quadratic effect can be estimated), a result that holds both in the risk dummy specifi-
cation and in the asset share specification. These patterns are only weakly reproduced.
The positive effect of change in tenure is found for Spain in both specifications, in the
US for assets and in Germany at low level of significance (8%). The change in tenure
squared is never significant except for Italy in the specification that uses absolute risk
aversion. Only the change in experience squared is solidly negative except for Italy.
The positive effect of years of education is only convincingly reproduced for Spain.
Instead, in the US for risk dummy and Italy (at 10% level) for absolute risk aversion
the effect of education is negative, which contradicts Shaw’s results.
In her Footnote 11, Shaw notes that gender and race are never significant, while
union membership has a negative effect. We replicate, for the US, the negative effect
of union membership. However, being black has a negative effect in the replication
and male has a negative effect although only for the asset share specification. In Spain,
men have faster wage growth, in Germany and Italy there are no differences by gender.
We also find big differences in explained variance (R2). It increases threefold in the
US replication (from 0.06 in Shaw to about 0.2), it is remarkably low in Italy (0.01)
and even more remarkably high in Spain (about 0.4).
4.2 Heteroscedasticity
As Shaw notes, the model implies heteroscedasticity, as risk attitude is correlated with
the error term (see Eqs. 7, 9). There would be even more heteroscedasticity if we allow
measurement errors in risk R or investment share α, as the error term would then also
correlate with X . In her test, however, Shaw shows that heteroscedasticity is rejected
(cf. p. 639). She does not pay much attention to it, although in fact it strikes at the heart
of the model: the theory explicitly implies heteroscedasticity. We use the same test
(White and Domowitz 1984)14 and present the results in the penultimate row (with
14 Using White and Domowitz (1984) notation, our wage growth equation can be written as Y = f (M, θ)+
e, where M is a vector containing all explanatory variables (Risk, X, and H ) and θ is the vector of coefficients
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the heading χ2 statistic) of Table 3. We find significant levels of heterocedasticity in
all specifications and countries. Thus, we now find support for the model where Shaw
did not.15
As heteroscedasticity is an important feature of the model, we regressed the squared
residual from the regressions in Table 3 on risk attitude, schooling, experience, and
tenure. Results are reported in Table 4. Risk attitude is indeed related to the residual
variance, but only in three out of the seven specifications.16 In the Asset specification,
there is never a significant effect, in the dummy and absolute risk aversion specifica-
tion we find higher residual variance for the less risk averse, except for Spain, where
there is no significant relationship at all. Education increases residual variance in the
US, but not in the other countries. Men, remarkably, have lower residual variance in
the US and Germany but not elsewhere. Tenure has no effect in the US, positive effect
in Spain but negative effect in Germany and a weakly significant non-linear effect in
Italy. With the exception of Germany, experience barely affects residual variance.
4.3 The effect of risk on wage growth is the same through all the human capital
variables
Like Shaw, we consider the option that the effect of risk on wage growth is different
for each of the four human capital variables used in the model. To do so, we expand
the regression equations as follows:
 ln Wi = a0 +
J∑
j=1
a j xi j + β0Asseti a0
+
J∑
j=1
β j Asseti a j xi j +
K∑
k=1
ahk Hki+ ei (12A)
 ln Wi = a0 +
J∑
j=1
a j xi j + [β30Risk3i + β40Risk4i ] a0
+
J∑
j=1
[
β3 j Risk3i + β4 j Risk4i
]
a j xi j +
K∑
k=1
ahk Hki+ei (12D)
Footnote 14 continued
(β, ax , ah). White and Domowitz’s test consist of regressing the residuals squared of the above equation
on the gradient vector ∂ f (M, θˆ )/∂θ and all non-redundant products ∂ f (M, θˆi )/∂θi ·∂ f (M, θˆ j )/∂θ j ,∀i, j .
The resulting N · R2 follows a χ2 distribution with K (K + 1)/N degrees of freedom.
15 In the results reported in Sects. 4 and 5, we do not correct for heteroscedasticity, to maintain compara-
bility with Shaw’s results.
16 Shaw does not run regressions but shows in a table in Footnote 22 that the variance of residual income
growth and the variance of residual log income level are higher for individuals in classes with lower risk
aversion.
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Shaw concludes that the coefficients β j are not identical for all the x j in the risk atti-
tude dummy specification and that therefore the constraint imposed in Eq. 11 is not
acceptable (Footnote 14). In the Asset specification, she reports “lower significance
levels,” without giving details.17
The estimation results for Eq. 12 are given in Online Appendix B (Table B1). For
Germany, we can confirm (as in Table 2) that risk does not play a role in determin-
ing wage growth, except through years of experience. For the US we find that the
specification still performs well, while for Spain, both specifications perform worse.
For Italy, the absolute risk aversion specification performs very well, the asset share
specification has mostly insignificant coefficients.
We now focus on whether or not the constraint of single risk interaction imposed in
Eq. 11 is justifiable. We do this by testing for each interaction term whether the product
of a j and β (Table 3) is identical to the product of a j and β j (Online Appendix Table
B1), using a t-test for statistical difference.18 The test results (t values) on significant
differences are given in Table 5, column I; full details are in Online Appendix Table
B2. For the case of Germany, we only show the t-tests for the interaction between risk
attitude and changes in years of experience squared since this is the only coefficient in
Table 3 and Online Appendix Table B1 that shows a level of significance approaching
acceptable levels. Equality of the risk aversion interactions is strongly rejected for the
US, Germany, and Spain, and less strongly but still significantly for Italy.19
4.4 Sensitivity to outliers and other misreporting
In the replication for the US we have tested the sensitivity of the results for outli-
ers. If we exclude the top and bottom 1%, 2% or 5%, respectively, of wage growth,
many coefficients are stable but the coefficients on some risk interaction terms change
drastically, in magnitude, from significant to insignificant, from positive to negative.
Shaw is silent on treatment of outliers, presumably because she does not apply any
adjustment.
During data preparation we noted several inconsistencies, such as measured expe-
rience increasing more than the time elapsed between two moments of observation.
Our results for Germany appeared quite sensitive to corrections of such inconsisten-
cies (like restricting the change in experience to time elapsed between observations).
However, since Shaw is also silent on these issues, we did not attempt a systematic
correction and choose to accept inconsistencies as measurement errors.
As noted in Online Appendix A, the variable Asset has a very high proportion
of zero’s. This would imply that the individual’s relative risk aversion is infinite, a
rather extreme assumption. We tested the sensitivity to this extreme value by adding a
dummy to distinguish zero and positive values; thus, the regression equation included
17 In Footnote 14 Shaw also notes that she dropped interaction of the intercept with the risk attitude
dummies. We decided not to follow her and stick to the full model.
18 Since comparing estimates involves combined coefficients (e.g. β ·axi ), we need to take into account the
standard deviation of such combination. This is done by using the “nonlinear combinations of estimators”
option in STATA.
19 For Italy the null hypothesis is not rejected for the interaction between ARA and years of schooling.
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Table 5 Testing model constraints
Variable t values on the test
I II III
βa j = β j a j θ j = βa j θ j = β j a j
US
ASSET
Constant 58.61 −76.98 89.03
 years tenure −115.42 −109.04 35.74
( years tenure)2 129.59 −26.38 −35.11
( years experience)2 −23.40 118.53 114.92
Years of education −48.33 3.43 −2.45
RISK
Constant 167.66 −191.23 261.17
 years tenure −181.16 −132.58 0.90
( years tenure)2 113.19 156.55 −37.10
( years experience)2 −152.80 −121.10 −10.90
Years of education −104.53 −90.43 0.62
Constant 167.36 −166.03 238.04
 years tenure −157.42 −101.07 0.70
( years tenure)2 76.08 82.33 −19.94
( years experience)2 −150.65 −100.79 −6.26
Years of education −153.90 −120.83 1.07
Germany
RISK
( years experience)2 −102.40 −87.83 0.01
Spain
ASSET
Constant −18.64 19.12 15.01
 years tenure/exp. −83.47 −49.01 0.01
( years tenure)2 4.92 3.78 −0.04
( years experience)2 87.61 49.43 0.13
Years of education 22.12 28.84 0.02
RISK
Constant 22.83 −0.26 18.86
 years tenure/exp. 28.44 −18.43 31.49
( years tenure)2 −41.51 6.99 −30.75
( years experience)2 −9.60 9.64 −13.17
Years of education −23.92 0.81 −14.64
Constant 17.88 0.23 14.24
 years tenure/exp. 39.40 −13.81 34.17
( years tenure)2 −41.29 −5.17 −20.79
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Table 5 continued
Variable t values on the test
I II III
βa j = β j a j θ j = βa j θ j = β j a j
( years experience)2 −24.84 8.56 −19.97
Years of education −15.50 10.01 −17.48
Italy
RISK
Constant 1.76 66.08 66.01
 years tenure −2.96 2.10 −0.83
( years tenure)2 4.50 3.07 7.59
( years experience)2 −2.83 3.40 0.56
Years of education −1.55 4.16 2.58
ASSET
Constant −77.25 −0.61 −80.28
 years tenure 279.11 −280.42 −0.97
( years tenure)2 −116.77 117.99 1.81
( years experience)2 −5.84 278.44 197.06
Years of education 863.52 −870.11 −4.38
Column I: Table B2 (Online Appendix); column II: Table B5a (Online Appendix); column III: Table B5b
(Online Appendix)
a dummy for having any risky financial assets at all and the share of risky financial
assets. In the SHIW data for Italy, with the highest proportion of zero’s, including the
dummy has no effect on the results for the other variables; the significance level for
the share of risky assets does not change in any relevant way.20
5 Testing constraints in Shaw’s model
5.1 Introduction
Shaw derives her specification from a theoretical model and thereby imposes a number
of a priori restrictions. In this section we will test whether the restrictions are accepted
by the data. We can write a general specification of the equations as
 ln Wi = a0 +
J∑
j=1
a j zi j + θ0Asseti +
∑
j=1
θ j Asseti zi j +
K∑
k=1
ahk Hki+ ei
(13A)
20 Brown and Taylor (2005) also find significant results if the sample is restricted to households with
positive risky asset shares.
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Table 6 Is risk attitude relevant at all?
US Germany Spain Italy
Dummy Assets Dummy Dummy Assets ARA Assets
Risk attitude R x x – – – – z
R × Human capital x x – z x x x
R × Controls x x – x – x x
x : t ≥ 1.96 for at least one variable in the group, Eq. 13; source Online Appendix Tables B3a–B3d
z: t ≥ 1.64 for at least one variable in the group, Eq. 13; source Online Appendix Tables B3a–B3d
– : t < 1.64 for all variables in the group, Eq. 13; source Online Appendix Tables B3a–B3d
ARA absolute risk aversion
 ln Wi = a0 +
J∑
j=1
a j zi j + θ3Risk3i + θ4 Risk4i +
J∑
j=1
θ3 j Risk3 j zi j
+
J∑
j=1
θ4 j Risk4 j zi j +
K∑
k=1
ahk Hki+ei (13D)
We call this model the unconstrained model, as it does not constrain the parameters
to reflect a strict multiplicative effect of risk or assignment of explanatory variables
to risk sensitive human capital variables X and other variables H . Starting from this
most general specification (13), we consider three questions.
The first question is whether risk is a relevant variable at all in the countries we
study. This is a simple test of significance on coefficients relating to risk, θ . The sec-
ond question is whether the assignment of variables to X (interaction) and to H (no
interaction) is accepted by the data. The null hypothesis here is that θ j = 0 for some
j so that the interaction with risk is not relevant, for variables such as male, union,
and black. The third question is whether the parameter constraints on the interaction
terms are acceptable. Equations 11 and 12 follow from restrictions on (13). Estimation
results for Eq. 13 are given in Online Appendix B, Tables B3a–B3d. We will now seek
an answer to our three questions.
5.2 Is risk statistically relevant at all?
As is clear from Table 6, the answer is not an unqualified yes. In Germany, there is
no effect of risk on wage growth when we use the unrestricted model specified in Eq.
13. In the other countries, there is some evidence that less risk averse individuals can
have different wage growth either through a direct effect or by risk attitude affecting
the impact of other relevant variables. Nevertheless, support for the underlying theory
is sometimes quite weak.
5.3 Is the assignment of variables between H and X statistically acceptable?
Shaw’s distinction is an a priori distinction between variables that are postulated to
affect investment and variables that do not. Education, tenure, and experience are
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selected to affect post-school investment, union membership, race, and gender are
supposed not to affect investment intensity or pay-off. The investment variables inter-
act with risk attitudes as the share of wealth invested in risky human capital depends
on risk attitude. If this model structure is correct, union, black, and male should have
no wage effects through the investment process: interaction with risk attitude should
be rejected by the data.
As is clear from Table 6, the prediction of no interaction effects is not supported.
Except for Germany and Spain (for Assets), interaction terms are significant for each
country (see Online Appendix Tables B3a–B3d for details). Shaw’s a priori choices
are not even supported in the replication for the US. In the attitude dummy specifi-
cation, Black interacts significantly with risk attitude, while in the asset specification
interaction with male is significant. In Spain, single and male has significant inter-
action in the dummy specification, while indeed in the asset specification no control
variable has significant interaction. In Italy, part-time has significant interaction in the
absolute risk aversion specification, while male and single significantly interact in the
asset specification.
Conversely, we find no significant interaction21 with many human capital variables:
not with education in Spain and Germany and not with education in the asset specifi-
cation for the US, not for tenure in all specifications except the US with risk dummy
and Spain (with assets and Italy with the self-assessed risk attitude, not for experience
in Spain and Italy), and not with experience in Germany.
We must conclude that in the US, in Spain and in Italy but not in Germany some
variables not directly connected to the investment process but reflecting demographic
differences also interact with risk attitude. Conversely, for all specifications except the
dummy specification in the US, there are human capital variables that should have an
effect through interaction with risk attitude but that do not.
5.4 Are the parameter constraints on interaction terms acceptable?
Shaw’s model constrains the interaction terms to a multiplicative specification with a
risk attitude term and human capital terms. We can test constrained interaction in two
specifications, i.e., with a common multiplier (test whether θ j = βa j as in Eq. 11 or
with variable-specific multiplier (test whether θ j = β j a j , as in Eq. 12). For Germany,
this implies to focus exclusively on the coefficients of changes in years of experience
squared and its interaction with risk, as this is the only statistically significant coef-
ficient. For this test, we accepted Shaw’s a priori distinction in X and H variables.
Estimation results for unconstrained interaction, like in Eq. 13 but including Shaw’s
a priori H , X assignment are given in Table B4 of the Online Appendix.
In column II of Table 5, we test whether θ j = βa j ; we compare estimates of Eq. 13
reported in Online Appendix Table B4 against estimates of Eq. 11 reported in Table 3;
full details are given in Table B5a in the Online Appendix. The result is clear: equality
of coefficients is decisively rejected for the US, Spain, Germany, and Italy.
21 At 5%; at 10% level results are slightly stronger.
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In column III of Table 5, we test whether θ j = β j a j ; we compare estimates of
Eq. 13 reported in Online Appendix Table B4 against estimates of Eq. 12 reported in
Table B1 in the Online Appendix; full details are given in Table B5b in the Online
Appendix. The results are mixed. The constraints are rejected for the US and accepted
for Germany. For Spain, the constraints are accepted for the asset specification and
rejected for the dummy specification. For Italy the results are mixed both for the asset
specification and for the dummy specification.
We conclude that the model restrictions on interaction are rejected in the strict case
of a single multiplier and lack universal support in the weaker case of variable-specific
multiplier.
6 Sensitivity to problems of risk attitude measurement
In Shaw’s original estimation, risk attitudes were estimated before measuring wage
growth. This is also the case for our US results. In the estimation for the other coun-
tries, risk attitudes are measured ex post. We did not consider the potential endogeneity
problem a serious threat, as we assumed that risk attitudes are more related to lifetime
wealth than to annual wages. But more reflection on the issue is in order.
Let’s note first of all that there is evidence that risk attitude in itself is a stable
personal trait. Harrison et al. (2003) find that the coefficient of constant relative risk
aversion measured in a laboratory experiment is stable: the regression coefficients
for measurements on the same individuals 6 months apart did not significantly differ
(controls were sex, race, details about education, age, and parental background). Nosic
and Weber (2009) find stability of risk attitudes measured in three quarters in a row
among active stock market participants. Zyphur et al. (2009)) use data on American
twins’ risk preferences (answers to three questions on hypothetical investments) and
find that about two thirds of economic risk preferences are genetically determined.
Cesarini et al. (2008), using data on Swedish twins, report that 25% of variation in
financial risk taking (choosing the degree of risk in the pension wealth portfolio) is due
to genetic influences. Moreover, these findings are consistent with extensive research
within the field of psychology showing that adults’ personality traits, including those
related to risk attitudes, are fairly stable over time (see the meta-analyses by Roberts
and Del Vecchio 2000, and Costa and McCrae 2002).
The endogeneity problem does not play a role in our replication for the US, as
we use the same ex ante measures of risk attitudes. Still, with the longer observation
period of wage growth, the original results are not confirmed. Replication results are
even weaker for the three European countries. But neither for these countries are we
inclined to blame endogeneity. In the German SOEP data, willingness to take risk in
general was reported by the same respondents in 2004 and 2006 (this is not the variable
we used above: we used the measure for risk in relation to occupation). In these data,
there was a fair amount of variation in individual’s reported risk attitude between the
two years, but measured risk attitude is not significantly related to change in wages.22
22 Risk in 2006 = 2.73(t = 54.12) + 0.47(t = 49.75) Risk in 2004 [R2 = 0.2381]; Risk in 2006 =
2.73(t = 50.32) + 0.47(t = 45.69) Risk measured in 2004 + 0.016(t = 1.14) HourlyWage2006−2002
[R2 = 0.2337].
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Considering the stability of measured risk attitudes in more controlled designs, we are
inclined to attribute a large share of the variability in the SOEP surveys to measurement
error.
For the Italian data, we find that the results are unstable across time periods, but
this is not exclusively related to ex ante or ex post measurement of risk attitude. With
the measure of absolute risk aversion measured in 1995, we essentially get the same
results with prior wage growth 1993–1995 and later wage growth 1995–2000. How-
ever, we find an insignificant effect with wage growth restricted to 1995–1998. With
asset share 1995, we find that the insignificant effect of prior wage growth 1993–1995
is turned into a significant negative effect on later wage growth 1995–2000 and an
insignificant effect on wage growth 1995–1998.
The SOEP data have no repeated panel measurement of risk attitude for occupa-
tion, but we can use the general risk attitude measure to see effects of time frame.
With Shaw’s basic specification, using the alternative measure of risk attitude has no
effect, but using a different time period for wage growth does have a substantial effect:
the estimation results with risk attitude measured in 2004 are quite different between
wage growth before 2004 and wage growth after 2004. But as noted, we did not find
a relationship between risk attitude and wage growth so there must be other factors at
play here. It just adds to the instability of the replication results.23
Our results are not sensitive to the domain in which risk attitudes are measured. In
the German data, we have measures in seven domains (occupation, driving, finance,
leisure, health, trust, general). Using risk attitude in any of the other domains than
occupation makes no difference to our results.
Potentially serious, in our view, is measurement error. We have given our reasons
for our conviction that risk attitude is essentially a stable lifetime trait. However, risk
attitude is not a directly observable variable and actual measurement may be subject
to many influences. As Wooldridge (2002, pp. 73–76) points out, this is no problem
if the measurement error is uncorrelated with the actual measure. But if the mea-
surement error is assumed uncorrelated with true unobserved risk attitude, we have
classical errors in variables and the estimated coefficient is biased downwards. This,
of course, is a problem for Shaw’s original estimates as well and the relevant question
that remains is whether the problem is more relevant in our estimates than in hers. We
have no priori reason to assume that this will be the case, but better understanding of
the properties of risk attitude measures would be most welcome.
7 Conclusion
Shaw’s model can be considered a forerunner of the emerging research on the role of
risk taking in schooling choices and their consequences. Her model is neatly derived
from investment theory and she reports clear support for the prediction that individuals
who are less afraid to take risk will experience higher wage growth. Model structure
and empirical results are sufficiently attractive to invite replication. Using data from
23 Brown and Taylor (2005) report a strong increase in R2 if the wage growth interval is increased from
2 to 3 to 5 years: 0.021, 0.087, 0.168.
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four countries, we draw the general conclusion that Shaw’s results are not very robust.
We found little support for her specific model; restrictions on parameters following
from her model were generally rejected. However, we do find evidence that wage
growth is related to risk attitude. Support for the relevance of risk attitudes is also
reported by Brown and Taylor (2005) for the UK, by Bonin et al. (2007) for Germany
and by Hryshko et al. (2008) for the US; in a different context, Diaz-Serrano (2005)
reports support for Italy.
Our conclusion from this paper is that continuing the line of research is promising.
Both intuition and direct observation as well as empirical research indicate that risk
taking is relevant in the labour market and that risk attitudes will matter. Our replication
has shown that the initial support for the Shaw model does not extend to other settings.
This forces us to reconsider how risk attitudes and wages are connected. We have made
a start in Budria et al. (2010), with a model that takes the life-cycle investment profile
as given by standard human capital theory and focuses on the mix between safe and
risky human capital. We find that support for the model is stronger for a regression in
wage levels than in wage changes. But clearly, more work is needed. In particular, it
would seem important to reflect on the possible channels of transmission of risk atti-
tude on wages and wage growth. One may think of participation in training, the nature
of training programs (one type of training may provide more protection in the labour
market than another) and of mobility, between jobs and employers. Job mobility may
involve taking on new risks (although this depends on the labour contract) and we also
know that voluntary movers usually have higher wage growth than stayers (see e.g.,
García-Pérez and Rebollo 2005). But also within firms, depending on the level and
the nature of the job, there will be scope for more or less risky actions and initiatives
and this may impact on careers. Charting his territory will be an interesting next step.
Differentiating by stage of the business cycle may also be relevant, as both risk taking
and risk sharing may vary over the cycle.
An essential issue, however, is adequate measurement of risk attitude. There are
good reasons to assume that risk attitudes have a fairly stable structure for a given
individual. But measures in survey data may be subject to large measurement errors
and these should be properly taken into account.
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